Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300090022-1

IAC-D-97/1 Final 28 September 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee

SUBJECT

: Report by the IAC Task Force on the President's

Proposal for Inspection

REFERENCE

: IAC-M-209, IAC-M-210, IAC-D-97

- 1. The President's proposal sets in motion a series of expanding problems involving the formulation of an inspection system to provide warning of attack, negotiations for the adoption and implementation of this system, and formulation and negotiation of an arms limitation agreement together with an inspection system to insure compliance. While there are uncertainties concerning the exact form which the solutions will take as they are developed under the cross-examination of U.S. and allied interests, to say nothing of Soviet demands and conditions, these uncertainties do not obscure the key problem in the proposal, which is that of devising an inspection system for security against surprise attack.
- 2. It is the IAC's problem at this time to make sure that the resources of the intelligence community are properly marshalled to meet the requirements of the planners and negotiators. These requirements can be summarized under three major headings, current intelligence reporting, intelligence estimates, and intelligence support for the planning of the inspection system itself.

# Current Intelligence Reporting:

Mr. Stassen has requested current intelligence support and is receiving this support through established channels. No IAC action is required.

## Estimates as Required:

National Estimates have been provided to Mr. Stassen at his request. He will presumably continue to make such requests as the need arises, whether in support of the development of the plan or in support of the U.S. negotiators.

Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300090022-1
IAC-D-97/1
Final
28 September 1955

## Intelligence Support for the Planning of an Inspection System:

For the development of the inspection plan Mr. Stassen has appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of the broad program: Army, Navy, Air, Atomic Energy, Industry and Power, Steel, Budget and Finance, and Communications. He has asked the Department of Defense to develop studies and recommendations and to participate in the work of the task forces, at the same time drawing his guidance for the major outline of the plan, including guide-lines of definition, from the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn are drawing on the military departments. It is Mr. Stassen's intention that the task forces work directly with the appropriate executive departments and agencies in developing their parts of the inspection system, including the list of intelligence targets for inspection.

#### Mr. Stassen's schedule is as follows:

15 Oct.

Task Forces complete their

parts of the plan

15 Oct. - 1 Nov.

Consolidation into one draft plan

1 Nov. - 1 Dec.

The draft plan in the hands of the departments and agencies of primary concern for official review and comments. (It is noted that Mr. Stassen will submit the draft plan to the Director of Central Intelligence.)

Submission to the President

The IAC has a clear and direct concern with an inspection system the first purpose of which is to produce the intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack. The IAC Watch Committee and its supporting staffs, for example, must have an intimate knowledge of such a system and the assurance that it provides adequate coverage of all the places and activities which can provide forewarning of attack. An inspection list of such places and activities would become an essential part of the watch list and

Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300090022-1
IAC-D-97/1
Final
28 September 1955

the information produced by any inspection system would have to be considered by the Watch Committee. As the Watch Committee and its supporting staffs are concerned in the first objective of the inspection system, so the estimates staffs are concerned in the inspection system as a whole, with its prospect of unfolding to a coverage of essential information on Soviet developments and capabilities. Furthermore, the inspection system and its lists must be carefully studied by all the IAC collecting services, particularly the covert, for it will be incumbent upon them to develop any and all means within their power for supplementing and checking information derived from inspection.

The individual members of the IAC are already contributing or will be asked to contribute to the development of the inspection plan in accordance with Mr. Stassen's requests and departmental instructions. When a consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready it will be submitted to the departments and agencies of primary concern. At that time the IAC should take concerted action in effecting a coordinated review of and comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft plan, including the inspection lists. There is one action, however, which it would seem prudent to take at this time and which can be taken without prejudice to or interference with the development of the plan. In order to prepare for the forthcoming review of the consolidated inspection plan it would be helpful to assemble a preliminary list of those critical intelligence targets which pertain to the prevention of surprise attack. The Watch Committee would be the natural facility in the IAC for this preparation.

When the consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready, the IAC should effect a coordinated review of its intelligence aspects, including inspection lists, calling upon the Watch Committee for assistance insofar as the plan is or includes an inspection system which is to produce the intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack. Comment on the plan might well take the form of a systematic estimate of the nature and degree of the security which the proposed system would give the U.S. in the light of the limitations inherent in the means of inspection, the possibility of concealment, the covert capabilities for supplementing and checking the information, and the general effect of implementation on the world situation.

Approved For Release 2004/03/26: CIA-RDP82-00400R000300090022-1
IAC-D-97/1
Final
28 September 1955

- 3. Should an inspection system of any magnitude be put into effect, practical problems will arise involving manpower, organization, and administration within the intelligence community in relation to the inspection system and its reporting. Consideration of such problems, however, should await review of the plan.
- 4. Noting that the IAC members are participating or will participate through their own departments in the development of the inspection plan, the IAC Task Force on Inspection recommends that:
  - a. The IAC coordinate the review of and the comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft inspection plan as consolidated by Mr. Stassen.
  - b. The Watch Committee assemble departmental intelligence targets lists which pertain to intelligence necessary for timely provision against surprise attack, and undertake a preliminary examination of the whole from the point of view of their adequacy for the mission of the Watch Committee.
  - c. The IAC dissolve its present Task Force on Inspection.

	<u> </u>	
/s/		
	Chairman	
	IAC Task Force on Inspection	

25X1